Introduction
The Eurocrisis that broke out in 2009 has given new momentum to the politicization of European integration, turning it into a mobilization force for intellectuals, political actors and citizens' movements (e.g. Statham and Trenz 2014) . From a crisis management and communication perspective, this is hardly a surprising development:
Crises, as threatening situations that belie expectations of normality and have widespread negative repercussions, inevitably create high levels of uncertainty, focus the attention of the media and increase the public's demand for information and proactive challenging of the decisions taken by political leaders (Seeger et al. 2003 ).
The Eurocrisis is the latest in a string of critical situations in the European Union's (EU) history, which have led to the gradual replacement of the 'permissive consensus' characterizing public opinion before the 1990s with a 'constraining dissensus' of 3 heightened public and media contestation (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Statham and Trenz 2012) . This 'EU politicization' sees the simultaneous rise or intensification of insurgent politics (ad-hoc citizens' protests, asymmetric communications), on the one hand, and further depreciation of representative politics, on the other (Kriesi 2012) .
In this context, the Eurocrisis is constitutive of a particular kind of public discourse -polarized, emotionally charged, flaming but also frequently evoking democratic norms and European integration core values -that contests the legitimacy of governments, at national and European level (de Wilde et al. 2013; Michailidou et al. 2014) . The manner in which Eurocrisis contestation unfolds and its content are, therefore, essential factors for the public legitimation and subsequently the success of attempted counter-crisis measures and reforms. Yet, while research has mainly focused on the institutional arrangements of EU 'crisis governance' (Crum and Fossum 2013; Peters et al. 2011; Willke 2010) , there is still limited understanding of how public contestation of the Eurocrisis is linked to the struggle of political elites for public legitimacy. 2 Looking at some of the most sensationalist news coverage in across EU countries, one could readily conclude that EU politicization in the context of the Eurocrisis is rapidly degenerating into a 'moral panic' blame game, 3 whereby certain national and EU political leaders and institutions are invoking the public's wrath on the basis not of their decisions before or during the crisis, but of stereotypical views about their nationality being inherently 'evil'. This is what Sierp and Karner (2016) describe as the 'essentialism' of stereotypes in the introductory article of this special issue. Here I examine this proposition from a crisis management and communication perspective, focusing on the case of the Greek public sphere during the early years of the Eurocrisis (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . Firstly, I discuss the concept of crisis accountability, as a key phase of 4 crisis management, and identify the conditions under which public accountability of crisis management turns into blame-games. Subsequently, the various actors are identified that drive the accountability (or blame-game) process forward and possible outcomes are discussed, drawing on crisis management and public sphere literature. In the second part of the paper, I combine data from different sources to map how the process of crisis accountability is unfolding in the Greek public sphere. Who contests Eurocrisis measures? Which aspects of Eurocrisis management does public critique focus on? How prominent are stereotypes in the Greek Eurocrisis discourse? The findings are then discussed in the third and final part of the article, where I revisit the concept of 'moral panic' in the context of crisis politics and consider the implications of the Eurocrisis politicization for the public legitimacy -ultimately, political success -of national and EU leadership in Greece.
Managing crises: from accountability to blame-games
Although approaches to crisis vary in the relevant literature, all categorisations can be neatly captured under Sellnow and Seeger's umbrella-definition that crises 'all generally evoke the notion of some dramatic, unanticipated threat, with widespread and wholly negative impact' (Sellnow and Seger 2013: 5) . Crises violate expectations of what is understood as 'normal' or 'how things should be' and require rapid responses to contain or mitigate the harm (Hermann 1963; Seeger et al. 2003) . 4 Furthermore, crises are disruptive: they interrupt the function of an organization thus posing a threat to the achievement of commonly agreed goals and/or affecting the performance of common problem-solving mechanisms -hence the need for rapid response. The increased levels of public communication due to the heightened media and public attention inevitably enhance the element of conflict in the public and political sphere. Perceptions are 5 crucial, in that they affect the severity of the threat and subsequently the degree of consensus about the measures that need to be taken in order to address it (Coombs 2010) . How public communication and contestation unfold during a crisis can be used as a central indicator for analysing type, dynamics and impact of that crisis on the transformation of political order and legitimacy (Seeger et al. 2003: 297) .
The basic expectation of any democratic leadership is that they will help safeguard society from the adverse consequences of crisis (Boin et al. 2005) . This is a complex and delicate process of observation, interpretation, strategic thinking, communication, and learning, which is often depicted in literature as neatly linear. In practice, crisis management is a multi-stage process with overlapping components (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Boin et al. 2005) . The main aim of most counter-crisis strategies tends to be the termination of the crisis. 5 It is not only the extent and quality of the introduced counter-crisis reforms that determine the success of a political leadership's attempts to terminate a crisis. Political approval and successful public legitimation of the reforms are also required. These cannot be achieved if the political leadership introducing the counter-crisis reforms is perceived as part or cause of the crisis. Although the outcome of this 'crisis public accountability' process (i.e. accountability attributed through the public debating of the crisis) is determined by several factors -discussed in more detail below -ultimately 'the burden of proof in accountability discussions lies with leaders [my emphasis]: they must establish beyond doubt that they cannot be held responsible for the occurrence or escalation of a crisis.' (Boin et al. 2005: 14) . This is not to suggest that political leaders must necessarily be assumed guilty of causing a crisis or its outcomes. It is to stress that political leaders have a responsibility to make themselves and their counter-crisis decisions available to institutional and public scrutiny. Even if they opt for a largely 'silent' crisis 6 management style, their actions will be publicly contested: this is the effect of the democratic public sphere.
The media, political opponents, agencies, legislators, interest groups, investigation committees and citizens all have a say in the evaluation of political leadership in times of crisis and the outcome may be far from fair for political leaders.
Yet, by maintaining transparency during the crisis period and facilitating the accountability process, political leaders help safeguard the core functions of democracy and preserve the democratic legitimacy of the system as a whole rather than their personal, short-term political survival. Therein also lays the difference between accountability and blame-games: the former generates valuable feedback that can be used to assess and improve the resilience of people, institutions and political systems (Boin et al. 2005: 102) . It relies on critical and honest debate of actors acting in good faith (Pidgeon 1997: 9; Seeger et al. 2003) . By contrast, blame-games are a race between actors to protect their interests by any means necessary, including defensive rationalization ('we made no mistakes'), covering up or distorting facts, deliberate silences or deflection of blame ('It is not my fault, I was following orders') (Boin et al. 2005: 103; Brändrström and Kuipers 2003) . Crucially, crises are a test for 'the democratic authenticity of the governance systems' in which they occur (Boin et al. 2005: 111-112) . Whether the crisis accountability process aims for 'truth-finding dialogue' or descends into 'inquisition and blame games' will serve as a proxy indicator for the 'health' of democracy (ibid.).
In order to determine which of the two aims are (attempted to be) fulfilled through the crisis accountability process, we must first identify the core arguments that constitute the crisis accountability discourse. How severe is the crisis deemed by the various actors? Where are its causes located? By classifying the answers given to these questions, Annika Brändström and Sanneke Kuipers (2003) construct an analytical scheme which predicts which actors (individual or collective) will be held responsible for a crisis. Depending on who is held accountable, the Brändström-Kuipers model then proposes four different outcomes of the accountability process, namely:
(1) scapegoating (specific, low-level executive or crisis response agencies or individuals within them are identified as responsible);
(2) organizational mishap (several executive agencies or operational organizations across a range of policies are responsible);
(3) failing policy makers (specific actors at the strategic political level are identified as responsible); or (4) policy/system failure (the crisis was caused by a flawed policy, or a flawed system of policy making and implementation, but senior policy makers are not necessarily responsible).
The type and extent of reforms (including sanctions) that will follow the crisis accountability process are contingent upon the type of actors found responsible for the crisis. Certain factors may influence the accountability process towards an actor-instead of network-focused discourse. If, for example, the future that the reform promises is not that which the citizens want; or if leaders fail to seize and retain the initiative in the crisis process (thus becoming established in public conscience as part of the crisis rather than the solution to it), then the likelihood of an actor-focused accountability process increases. Similarly, any of the following will quite certainly trigger a strong backlash from society and will likely bias the accountability process towards assigning responsibility and blame to specific actors instead of systems:
-abuse of power (perceived or real) during crisis in order to push through reform; -failure to effectively communicate and persuade citizens about the need for this reform;
-attempt of superficial rather than substantial reform, i.e. appearing to be making changes but not actually incorporating any learning in the attempted reforms (Boin et al. 2005; Seeger et al. 2003) .
Existing literature on the chronic malfunctions and weaknesses both of the Greek state apparatus and of the Greek political culture (Lyrintzis 1987; Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; Pappas 2014) , leads us to expect that any of the above factors may be have played a role in the way that crisis accountability was publicly attributed during the early Eurocrisis period. Indeed, by the end of 2013, when Greece was entering its fifth year of crisis governance and seventh year of recession, key aspects of the Greek economy, such as government debt, unemployment and economy contraction, remained despairingly high (IMF 2013a and 2013b). Nevertheless, both Greek and European leaders appeared optimistic, At the same time, the 'Eurocrisis years' governments had been following a consistently undemocratic path, in terms of both twisting democratic procedures in order to pass crisis-linked legislation and supressing dissent among their party ranks and the public (Michailidou 2014) , more so than in the pre-crisis decades.
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Certain measures deemed crucial to improve the state's finances and to redress the social justice imbalances of previous decades -such as tackling large-scale tax evasion, public sector corruption or unemployment -remained on paper only. Others, including repeated reductions of salaries, pensions and public welfare spending had further lowered the living standards for ever wider sections of the population and had in certain cases been deemed unconstitutional by Greek courts. 7 Throughout the studied period, there was thus a strong discrepancy between the reality that the vast majority of Greek people faced daily and the public claims made by national and EU decision-makers.
Crisis accountability, the media and the public: a public sphere approach However, the match between counter-crisis reforms and crisis accountability outcomes is not always guaranteed. In order to determine whether we are dealing with democratic truth-seeking or self-serving blame games, we need to look not only at the claims made publicly by the different actors about who is or should be held responsible, but also at the ways these claims are publicly presented and justified, as well as the conditions under which crisis accountability takes place. Is public contestation open to competing views or do specific actors monopolize the debate? What do crisis evaluations tell us about the way the crisis is perceived? Is critique focusing on individuals or systems and policies? In other words, we need to take a close look at the public sphere, as the central locus of political contestation.
My starting point is not the ideal-type, deliberative public sphere, but rather the 'imperfect', mediatized public sphere, whose democratizing effect rests primarily with its power to 'open up decision making to public critique' (Statham and Trenz 2014: 7) .
Conflicts and polarization are not only expected but also welcome in the case of the EU, in so far as they function as structuring and integrating elements in an otherwise fragmented public sphere Michailidou et al. 2014) . The politicisation of the Eurocrisis and of the EU's representative system more broadly are understood as a process of mediatization and mediation through which formalised representative relationships have been conducive to but also constrained by mass media attention. Mediatization is 'the interrelation between the operational modes of the mass media and the political system. This implies not only media impact on the political process and modes of decision-making, but also, in broader terms, impact on the infrastructure of political communication, i.e. on the contours of the public sphere.' (Michailidou and Trenz 2010: 4) . By contrast, 'mediation' reflects the relay function of an actor in the communication process and as such, it is a broader term that stretches beyond the media's role in the public sphere.
Such an approach of the crisis accountability mechanism simultaneously emphasizes the centrality of mediatized public contestation in the crisis management process; decouples the process of accountability and legitimation through public debate from the quality of its outcome (it may not necessarily lead to the legitimation of political leadership's choices or to a termination of the crisis); and offers an explanatory framework that allows us to trace the thought process behind different types of crisis contestation arguments and subsequently to hypothesize about the potential outcomes of the accountability process for political leadership. Drawing on this 'mediatized crisis accountability' approach, I take a closer look at the conditions of the mediatized public sphere in Greece during the studied period. The aim is two-fold: Firstly, to outline the context and content of anti-German and Eurosceptic public discourse in relation to the Eurocrisis. Secondly, The focus here is on the contestation of German and EU political leadership, but I expand to national politicians and financial institutions in order to put Eurocrisis-related anti-Germanism and Euroscepticism in context.
The Eurocrisis accountability process in Greece: a populist blame-game foretold?
Personifying the causes of the crisis is a strategy commonly favoured by Greek politicians (but certainly not limited to them). As Tzogopoulos (2012: 6) observes …scapegoating has been the persuasion technique of choice for members of both the conservative and the socialist parties for years, helping them to achieve their own priorities at the expense of the Greek population… Being well-versed in finding scapegoats, it is not surprising that Greek politicians have adopted a similar persuasion strategy since October 2009. This is frequently directed, but not limited to, the condemnation of Germany for 'the slow death of the Hellenic economy' (ibid.). The critique that Greek politicians direct at the German leadership tends to focus primarily on:
(1) Its 'dogmatic' insistence on austerity measures, even though these are strangling 
Public opinion
Since the outbreak of the Eurocrisis, surveys of Greek public opinion have invariably From the above, it becomes clear that anti-German public opinion in Greece is specifically directed not at the German people as a whole, but the German political leadership in particular. Given Germany's role in the Eurocrisis, this is entirely predictable from a crisis management perspective. That a substantial proportion of the population conflates today's German leadership with the Nazis confirms the presence of the discursive 'seeds' that could lead to an actor-focused blame-game 'witch hunt', whereby senior political leaders are held responsible for the crisis and their legitimacy is questioned on the grounds of them being inherently 'evil'; with that attribution of 'evil' then extrapolated to the entire peoples these leaders represent.
Nevertheless, a closer reading of opinion poll statistics conducted before and during the crisis, points to a deeper-running 'anti' attitude among the Greek people and a potentially more damaging one for the EU polity: one of general scepticism towards national political institutions and the leaders of the biggest (and traditionally also perceived as the most powerful and influential) EU member states. Greek political parties have always enjoyed poor or abysmally poor trust rates, which a look at all
Standard Eurobarometer surveys can quickly confirm. However, the parliament as an institution has in pre-crisis years always enjoyed the Greek public's trust and so have the EU institutions. The Eurocrisis appears to have dealt this trust a near-fatal blow.
Crucially, a cross-referencing of polls from different sources shows that the perception of a power imbalance within the EU runs back a decade (at least in terms of opinion poll data) and is widespread across EU member states (European Commission 2004; Pew Research Centre 2013; Scharioth 2012) . 9 The Eurocrisis has strengthened the view that the EU system is built on inequality of power and now also of access to resources. The conditions are therefore favourable for a more generalized system-focused accountability result, whereby the EU's legitimacy to represent the people of Greece and to handle the current crisis is questioned and possibly revoked.
Crisis, mediatization and the Greek public sphere
Greek news media sphere in transition. The Eurocrisis has had a profound impact on the referred to as 'the Troika'). Secondly, there is a divide between internet-only news sources and news media with a dual online-offline presence (print media, TV), with the former largely falling under the anti-'bail-out' block. Since the media provide the structure for the public sphere, it follows that the Greek public sphere is a divided space; the extent to which a member of the public will be exposed to technocratic hegemony discourse, or competing views about the Eurocrisis depends not only on their preference for online or offline news but also on the political views they and their preferred newspaper supports.
Sensationalist framing with strong anti-German, Nazi connotations is actually not that prominent. In fact, the vast majority of news feeds and complete articles referring to the Eurocrisis (80% of all complete articles coded and 70% of the RSS feeds) have a national perspective. We can broadly classify articles with a national perspective under two categories: those that highlight a 'national interest' angle of specific EU politics events or developments, such as news items in Greek online media covering the establishment of the EFSF mechanism and discussing the implications of this for Greece's economy and fiscal policy; and those that turn specific EU events or developments into a backdrop story for national politics, particularly inter and intraparty conflicts. Critique on German or EU leadership may be present in such articles, but then it tends to focus on the specific decisions or statements rather than portray the German chancellor or any other EU leader as a Nazi. During the studied period 2010-2013, he news sources that can be classified as anti-German 'moral panic' instigators fall mostly, though by no means exclusively, under either the nationalist/extreme-right side of the political ideology spectrum or the sensationalist tabloid type of journalism.
The former tend to be low-circulation newspapers offering a curious mixture of 21 religious, apocalyptic analysis of current events, conspiracy theories about extraterrestrials, strong anti-Semitism and of course strong anti-government and anti-German rhetoric based on the WWII experience. The latter pose a bigger challenge, in that they are popular with the public, have a 'mainstream news' reporting style and their antiGermanism is more sophisticated, thus more credible.
Readers' frames The image that jumps out of readers' comments is of a nation in turmoil that is struggling to find a way out of a precarious situation in a united manner.
The Greek political system is rejected as shamelessly corrupt and self-serving;
particularly the Socialist party PASOK and conservative New Democracy that until January 2015 had been either alternating in government or governing in coalition. The majority of the analysed comments reject the Greek political system because they equate it with whichever of the two parties they oppose. The ills of the Greek political system are thus acknowledged but arguments are so tied up to specific political parties or even individual political actors, that all debates inevitably degenerate to emotive, 'enraged fan' behaviour (personal attacks, outright dismissal of different points of view, slogan-style comments, denial of facts). Debates are introvert in that 'others' (EU partners, EU peoples, EU institutions or countries beyond the EU) are sparsely mentioned and then largely to appoint blame (it is the EU/ Troika/ Germany/ global markets' fault). There is hardly any mention of other EU countries in crisis (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy) and in the few instances that these countries do appear in the conversation, it is either to remind us that Greece is in a worse position (i.e. the others countries got a better 'deal' because they 'played the game more smartly') or to warn us and the people of other EU countries that we are all on the same boat and will soon be sharing the same 'austerity fate'. 
'Us versus them'

Conclusion
Combining insights from crisis communication and public sphere theories, I have analysed the politicization of the Eurocrisis in Greek public discourse with two aims:
Firstly, to create a general map with the actors and types of claims made publicly about the causes and effects of the Eurocrisis, and secondly, to more specifically determine the prominence of Eurosceptic and anti-German discourse.
The Greek public sphere of the Eurocrisis years emerges from the analysis as deeply divided along the pro-and anti-crisis management strategy followed by the Greek governments at the behest of EU institutions and other member-state governments. The Greek media sphere offers crisis coverage that is deeply flawed, from a journalist credibility perspective. Most events or developments regarding the Eurocrisis are presented in a seemingly neutral manner, without journalistic analysis or commentary. There is a strong focus on the national politics, with the social and EU/transnational dimensions of the crisis rather overlooked. Sensationalist anti-German frames are not frequently encountered but the fact that they appear in high-popularity media and coincide with the general public's feelings towards Germany makes such frames more powerful. Sensationalist anti-German frames are also used occasionally by politicians of various ideological and party backgrounds, though the vast majority of anti-German or anti-EU critique coming from politicians' lips is mostly focused on a vision of an alternative Europe and the shortcomings of the crisis management strategy currently being followed. Crucially, the Greek public identifies the national, German and EU leaderships as directly responsible for the crisis and the subsequent suffering of the Greek people.
On the basis of the presented evidence, we can speculate that the most likely outcome of the current crisis accountability process would be an actor-focused one, whereby responsibility is attributed to senior policy makers or political leaders and sanctions follow (or at least are proposed). The ingredients for a generalised 'moral panic' whereby all Germans will be collectively held responsible for the ills of Greece due to the former's inherent 'evil', are present but not in sufficient doses to make such a moral panic likely. Nevertheless, a focus on individual actors -be that Ms Merkel, Mr ξανάρχονται') with a powerful anti-war message. Shot during a most turbulent time for Greece (the civil-war years that followed the end of the WWII-Nazi occupation of the country), the movie features Theodoros, a quiet, kind man, who one day witnesses a terrifying civil-war conflict while out shopping and upon his return home, he falls asleep and dreams that Hitler is alive and the Nazis are back in Greece with more powerful weapons. The movie -a 'satirical nightmare' as its creators called it -won critical acclaim and is considered one of the best examples of Greek filmography.
For the original film poster in English (on which the title is 'The Nazis strike again') and a selection of links with more information on the movie in English, see Βικιπαίδεια 2014 (Greek Wikipedia).
